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Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
Last term, the Supreme Court for the first time extended double
jeopardy protection to a criminal defendant sentenced by a jury. In
Bul'ngton v. Missouri,' the Court held that where a sentencing proceed-
ing had the hallmarks of a trial on guilt or innocence, the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause2 prohibited the imposition of a greater sentence at retrial.
Before Bullington, the Court had refused to extend to sentencing the well-
established principle that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial
of a defendant who has been acquitted of an offense. The holding in
Bulngon represents a dramatic departure from the Court's longstand-
ing judgment that the distinctions between a sentence and an acquittal
are more critical than the similarities. The Court refused to adhere slav-
ishly to precedent, and instead looked to the purposes behind the Clause
in deciding whether to extend double jeopardy protection to sentencing.
I. MISSOURI LAW
Missouri's death penalty legislation contains, as a result of the
Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,3 substantive sentencing standards
and procedural safeguards. Missouri law requires a separate
presentence hearing for a defendant whom a jury convicts of capital
murder.4 There are only two possible sentences for capital murder-
death or life imprisonment without eligibility for probation or parole for
1 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981), reo'g, State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo.
1980).
2 "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb .. " U.S. CONST. amend. V.
3 408 U.S. 238 (1972). In Furman, the Court held that the eighth and the fourteenth
amendments required the States to impose safeguards to protect against capricious or dis-
criminatory impositions of the death sentence. Id.
4 Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.006 (1978). Section 565.006 sets forth Missouri's procedure for
imposition of the death penalty by a jury:
1. At the conclusion of all trials upon an indictment or information for capital
murder heard by a jury, and after argument of counsel and proper charge from the
court, the jury shall retire to consider a verdict of guilty or not guilty without any consid-
eration of punishment. In nonjury capital murder cases, the court shall likewise first
consider a finding of guilty or not guilty without any consideration of punishment. In
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fifty years.5 The same jury which finds the defendant guilty hears evi-
dence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation of punishment at the
presentence hearing.6 The jury must decide whether there were any cir-
cumstances in mitigation or aggravation, 7 and whether the aggravating
circumstances are sufficient to warrant the imposition of the death pen-
each jury capital murder case, the court shall not give instructions on any lesser included
offense which could not be supported by the evidence presented in the case.
2. Where the jury or judge returns a verdict or finding of guilty as provided in
subsection 1 of this section, the court shall resume the trial and conduct a presentence
hearing before the jury or judge, at which time the only issue shall be the determination
of the punishment to be imposed. In such hearing, subject to the laws of evidence, the
jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, and aggravation
of punishment, including the record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty,
or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant, or the absence of any such Orior criminal
convictions and pleas. Only such evidence in aggravation as the prosecution has made
known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. The jury or judge shall also
hear argument by the defendant or his counsel and the prosecuting attorney regarding
the punishment to be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall open and the defendant
shall conclude the argument to the jury or judge. Upon conclusion of the evidence and
arguments, the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire
to determine the punishment to be imposed. In capital murder cases in which the death
penalty may be imposed by a jury or judge sitting without a jury, the additional proce-
dure provided in section 565.012 shall be followed. The jury, or the judge in cases tried
by a judge, shall fix a sentence within the limits prescribed by law. The judge shall
impose the sentence fixed by the jury or judge. If the jury cannot, within a reasonable
time, agree to the punishment, the judge shall impose sentence within the limits of the
law; except that, the judge shall in no instance impose the death penalty when, in cases
tried by a jury, the jury cannot agree upon the punishment.
3. If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence
hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.
5 Id. at § 565.008. 1.
6 Id. at § 565.006.2. The court may admit evidence in aggravation only if the prosecu-
tion has made it known to the defendant prior to his trial. Id.
7 Section 565.012 lists the aggravating and mitigating circumstances:
1. In all cases of capital murder for which the death penalty is authorized, the
judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider:
(1) Any of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection 2
which may be supported by the evidence,
(2) Any of the statutory mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsection 3
which may be supported by the evidence,
(3) Any mitigating or aggravating circumstances otherwise authorized by law, and
(4) Whether a sufficient aggravating circumstance or circumstances exist to war-
rant the imposition of death or whether a sufficient mitigating circumstance or circum-
stances exist which outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances found to
exist.
2. Statutory aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:
(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for
capital murder, or the offense was committed by a person who has a substantial history
of serious assaultive criminal convictions;
(2) The offense was committed while the offender was engaged in the commission
of another capital murder;
(3) The offender by his act of capital murder knowingly created a great risk of
death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which
would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;
(4) The offender committed the offense of capital murder for himself or another,
for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;
(5) The capital murder was committed against a judicial officer, former judicial
officer, prosecuting attorney or former prosecuting attorney, circuit attorney or former
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alty or are outweighed by mitigating circumstances." A jury imposing
the death penalty must set forth in writing the aggravating circum-
stances it finds beyond a reasonable doubt 9 and must believe beyond a
reasonable doubt that these circumstances warrant imposition of the
death penalty. 10 The trial judge instructs the jury that it need not im-
pose the death penalty, even if aggravating circumstances exist. 1 If the
jury cannot arrive at a unanimous decision to impose the death sen-
tence, it must impose the alternative sentence. 12
II. FACTS
Petitioner Robert Bullington was indicted for capital murder in
December 1977,13 and the prosecution informed the defense that the
State would seek the death penalty if the jury convicted the defendant
circuit attorney, elected official or former elected official during or because of the exercise
of his official duty;
(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit capital murder or commit-
ted capital murder as an agent or employee of another person;
(7) The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it
involved torture, or depravity of mind;
(8) The capital murder was committed against any peace officer, corrections em-
ployee, or fireman while engaged in the performance of his official duty;
(9) The capital murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from,
the lawful custody of a peace officer or place of lawful confinement;
(10) The capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering
with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of himself
or another.
3. Statutory mitigating circumstances shall include the following:
(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;
(2) The capital felony was committed while the defendant was under the influence
of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the
act;
(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the capital felony committed by another
person and his participation was relatively minor;
(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domina-
tion of another person;
(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or
to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired;
(7) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
4. The statutory instructions as determined by the trial judge to be warranted by
the evidence shall be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The
jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, signed by the
foreman of the jury, the aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found be-
yond a reasonable doubt.
5. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in
this section is so found, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
8 Id. at § 565.012.1.
9 Id. at § 565.012.4.
1o 101 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing MISSOURI APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS- CRIMINAL § 15.42
(1979)).
11 101 S. Ct. at 1856 (citing MISSOURI APPROVED INSTRUCTIONS-CRIMINAL § 15.46).
12 Id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.2.
13 101 S. Ct. at 1856. His conviction stemmed from the abduction and death by drown-
ing of a young woman. Id.
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of capital murder. 14 The jury found Bullington guilty of capital murder
at the guilt or innocence phase of the trial, and after the presentence
hearing fixed his punishment at imprisonment for life.' 5
The trial court granted Bullington's motion for a new trial' 6 after
the Court handed down its decision in DLuren v. Missouri,17 which held
that a Missouri law allowing women to claim automatic exemption
from jury service deprived a defendant of his right to a jury drawn from
a fair cross-section of the community. The prosecution served a notice
on the defense stating that it would once again seek the death penalty. 18
The defense moved to strike the notice on fifth amendment Double
Jeopardy grounds.' 9 The Supreme Court of Missouri ultimately sus-
tained the State's position and held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
did not bar the imposition of the death penalty upon the petitioner at
his new trial.
20
III. SUPREME COURT OPINION
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, 2 ' first acknowledged
that the Court has not traditionally regarded the imposition of a partic-
ular sentence as an acquittal of any more severe sentence that could
have been imposed.22 He hastened to add, however, that the procedures
resulting in the imposition of life imprisonment upon Bullington were
very different from those in cases where the Court has held the Double
Jeopardy Clause inapplicable to sentencing.23 In Bullington, the sentenc-
ing procedures possessed the same critical characteristics as a trial on
guilt or innocence: the jury lacked unbounded discretion to select a
punishment from a wide range, and the prosecution undertook the bur-
14 The prosecution's notice announced that it would seek to prove two aggravating cir-
cumstances: first, that defendant had a history of criminal convictions for assaults, Mo. REV.
STAT. § 565.012.2 (1); and second, that the crime was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horri-
ble or inhuman in that it involved torture, or depravity of mind," id. at § 565.012.2 (7).
15 101 S. Ct. at 1856.
16 Id.
17 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
18 101 S. Ct. at 1856. This notice indicated that the prosecution would present evidence
on the same aggravating circumstances as it did during the first trial. Id.
19 Id. at 1856-57. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), made the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause of the fifth amendment applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment.
20 State er rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d 908 (Mo. 1980), app'dsub nom., Bullington v.
Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981). The court also held that neither the eighth amendment nor
the Due Process Clause precluded the imposition of the death sentence. Id.
21 Justices Brennan, Stewart, Marshall and Stevens joined in the opinion of the Court.
22 101 S. Ct. at 1857.
23 Id. at 1858.
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den of establishing certain facts beyond a reasonable doubt. 24
The majority then explained that these procedures excepted this
case from the established rule that because there is no bar to retrying a
defendant who has succeeded in overturning his conviction-the "slate
[has been] wiped clean," 25 the defendant upon reconviction may receive
whatever punishment is lawful. 26 The Court declared that Missouri's
capital sentencing procedure in effect requires the prosecution to prove
its case.2 7 The jury must decide whether the prosecution proved addi-
tional facts beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the death sen-
tence. If the jury decides that the prosecution has failed, a double
jeopardy bar arises. Finally, the Court reasoned that the values underly-
ing the absolute finality of a verdict of acquittal apply when a jury has
rejected the death penalty.28 Justice Black summarized those values in
Green v. United States29 :
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-
American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources
and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an
individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrass-
ment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state
of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.30
Justice Powell's dissenting opinion3  characterized the Court's
opinion as a departure 32 from such precedents as Stroud v. United States,33
North Carolina v. Pearce,34 Chafffn v. Sonchcombe, 35 and United States v.
24 Id. The Court characterized the sentencing procedure as "a trial on the issue of punish-
ment so precisely defined by the Missouri statutes." Id.
25 Id. at 1860 (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 721 (1969)). See United
States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964); United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896).
26 101 S. Ct. at 1859-61. This is subject to the limitation that the defendant receive credit
for time served. Id. at 1860.
27 Id. at 1861.
28 Id.
29 355 U.S. 184 (1957).
30 Id. at 187-88.
31 The Chief Justice, Justice White and Justice Rehnquist joined in the dissent.
32 101 S. Ct. at 1863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
33 251 U.S. 15 (1919). In Stroud, the defendant, the "Birdman of Alcatraz," was convicted
of the murder of a prison guard and sentenced to life imprisonment by a jury. Upon retrial,
another jury convicted Stroud of first degree murder, but sentenced him to death. The
Supreme Court held that the jury's increased punishment of death upon retrial did not place
him in double jeopardy.
34 395 U.S. 711. In this case the Court held that
at least since 1919, when Stroud . United States . . .was decided, it has been settled that a
corollary of the power to retry a defendant is the power, upon the defendant's reconvic-
tion, to impose whatever sentence may be legally authorized, whether or not it is greater
than the sentence imposed after the first conviction.
Id. at 720.
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DiFrancesco.36 The dissent also highlighted the essential difference be-
tween determinations of guilt or innocence and sentencing-the objec-
tive nature of the question of guilt or innocence versus the lack of an
objective measure by which the court may judge the sentencer's decision
correct or erroneous. 37 Justice Powell focused on a question different
from the one asked by the majority: he asked whether the reasons for
considering an acquittal on guilt or innocence apply equally to a sen-
tencing decision, rather than whether the two procedures were similar.38
Since the dissent believed that the reasons for considering an acquittal
final did not apply equally to a sentencing decision,39 it refused to apply
the implicit acquittal principle40 to sentencing.
4'
IV. DISCUSSION
Before this case, the Court had held that the Double Jeopardy
Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant who has been acquitted of a
crime,42 but had refused to hold the same principle applicable to sen-
tencing.4 3 The Court held the implicit acquittal theory applicable in
cases such as Green v. United States," but has refused to make this judg-
ment in cases such as North Carolina v. Pearce.4 5 In Green, the Couit
looked upon the jury's verdict of second degree murder as an implicit
acquittal of first degree murder, while in Pearce, the Court held that a
sentence imposed after a first conviction could be increased upon re-
conviction. The Court traditionally has explained the differing results
in the two situations on the basis of the fundamental difference between
acquittals and sentences.46' In Bullington, the Court for the first time ap-
35 412 U.S. 17, 24 (1973). In Chafji, the Court declined, for reasons stated in Pearce, to
overrule Stroud. Id.
36 101 S. Ct. 426 (1980). See text accompanying notes 64-70 infra.
37 101 S. Ct. at 1863-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 1864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
39 See text accompanying note 30 sufra.
40 The Green case illustrates the implicit acquittal approach. In Green, the Court consid-
ered whether the State could retry a defendant for first degree murder after the jury at the
first trial had found him guilty only of second degree murder. The Court reasoned that the
jury's first verdict was an implicit acquittal of first degree murder. The Court stated that
Green was in direct peril of being convicted of first degree murder at his first trial and that he
only need run that gauntlet once. Therefore, the second trial for first degree murder imper-
missibly put Green in jeopardy twice for the same offense. 355 U.S. at 190.
41 101 S. Ct. at 1864'(Powell, J., dissenting).
42 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. at 433; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1,
16 (1978); United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 571 (1977); Fong Foo v.
United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962); Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 188.
43 See United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. at 437; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S.
at 23-24; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723; Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. at 18.
44 355 U.S. 184. See note 40 sura.
45 395 U.S. 711.
46 101 S. Ct. at 1863 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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plied the theory of implicit acquittal to sentencing.
The Court accepted, for two major reasons, Bullington's claim that
the Double Jeopardy Clause barred the imposition by the second jury of
the death penalty when the first jury had declined to impose the death
sentence. 47 First, the Court treated Bullington's first sentence as an im-
plicit acquittal of a greater sentence.48 Second, it reasoned that Bulling-
ton's interest in the finality of his first sentence prohibited the imposition
of a harsher sentence on retrial.49 Both of these reasons are tenable.
Bullington's first challenge to the increase in his sentence was on
the ground that the increased sentence violated the prohibition against
further prosecution following an acquittal. 50 The Court accepted the
argument that his first sentence was an implicit acquittal of the death
sentence, even though it had rejected this same argument in earlier
cases. 5 1 Since the similarities between a favorable original verdict, such
as a finding of not guilty, and the favorable original sentence in Bulling-
ton were so striking, the notion of implicit acquittal won a majority of
the Court.
The Court also accepted Bullington's second argument, which was
based on his interest in finality or repose. This is the defendant's interest
in an end to the embarrassment, expense and anxiety of criminal prose-
cution.5 2 Bullington's claim succeeded because the reasons for accord-
ing an acquittal absolute finality apply with equal force to this
particular sentencing decision.
Bullington's implicit acquittal theory convinced the Court because
it decided the case not by reference to unhelpful labels but by looking to
the substance of the sentencing procedure in relation to the purposes of
the Double Jeopardy Clause. In the past, the Court refused to view
determinations of sentence as implicit acquittals of a greater sentence
because of the significant differences between sentences and decisions on
the issue of guilt and innocence. 53 The similarities, however, between
the Missouri sentencing procedures and procedures surrounding deci-
47 Professor Westen's seminal articles on the Double Jeopardy Clause have identified
three important values which underlie the clause: "(1) the integrity of jury verdicts of not
guilty, (2) the lawful administration of prescribed sentences, and (3) the interest in repose."
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Relections on overnment Appeals of Criminal Sentences,
78 MICH. L. REv. 1001, 1002 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as The Three Faces]. See Westen &
Drubel, TowardA General Theoa of DoubleJeopardy, 1978 Sup. Or. REv. 81 [hereinafter referred
to as Gneral Theoqy]. Only the first and third values are pertinent in the instant case.
48 101 S. Ct. at 1861.
49 Id.
50 Id. at 1859-61.
51 Id.
52 Id. at 1861. See Westen, The Three Faces, supra note 47, at 1033.
53 See cases cited in note 43 supra. The Court presumably will continue to hold that sen-
tencing decisions reached under traditional procedures will not operate as implicit acquittals.
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sions regarding guilt or innocence outweigh the differences.54 Faced
with a set of sentencing procedures unlike any that it had considered
before, the Court refused to force its analysis into the old rubric for the
sake of consistency alone, but instead fashioned a new theory to fit
changed sentencing procedures.
A jury, rather than a judge, sentenced the defendant in Bullington.55
This procedure is similar to the one followed for determinations of guilt
and innocence, which are made by the jury. Another similarity is the
lack of discretion to pick a punishment from an almost infinite number
of possibilities.5 6 The Court emphasized that in previous sentencing
cases- Pearce, Chaffi, and Stroud-the sentencer possessed unbounded
discretion to select a punishment.57 In Bullington, in contrast, the jury
had a choice between only two alternatives,5 8 very much like the choice
a jury has when it makes a guilt or innocence decision.59
The sentencing decision in Bullington also resembled a decision re-
garding guilt or innocence because the court instructed the jury which
circumstances justified the imposition of a particular sentence, and be-
cause the standard used was proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ° Tradi-
tionally, individuals making sentencing decisions, usually judges, receib e
no guidance as to "which factors should be considered, under what cir-
cumstances, and how they are to be weighted .... ,,61
The sentencing decision in Bullington, like all such decisions, is,
however, different from a decision on guilt or innocence because the jury
knows exactly the consequences of its decision to the defendant when it
sentences, but knows only approximately the consequences to the de-
fendant of a conviction on a particular offense.62 For example, the jury
cannot ascertain the ultimate consequences to the defendant of a convic-
tion of murder in the first degree as contrasted with a conviction of sec-
ond degree murder, but it knows precisely the effect on the defendant of
a sentence of fifty years as opposed to ten years.63 This characteristic of
54 101 S. Ct. at 1858.
55 Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.006.
56 Id. at 565.008.1.
57 101 S. Ct. at 1858.
58 Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.008.1.
59 Indeed, a jury making a guilt or innocence determination may in certain situations
have even more discretiorn than Bullington's Missouri jury possessed, for it may have several
sentencing choices, including first, second, and third degree murder.
60 Westen, The Three Faces, supra note 47, at 1022-23 n.68.
61 Hoffman & Stover, Refarm in the Determination of Pi-on Terms: Equip, Determinany, and the
Parole Release Function, 7 HOFSTRA L. REv. 89, 96 (1978). See M. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973); Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and
Sentencing Processes, 75 HARV. L. REV. 904 (1962).




the decision in Bullingon, which is shared with all sentencing decisions, is
not important enough to outweigh all the other characteristics which
contribute to a strong analogy between this sentencing procedure and
traditional guilt or innocence determinations.
The recent decision in United States v. DiFrancesco,64 in which the
Court held that the "dangerous special offender" provision of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act of 1970 did not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause, 65 is distinguishable from Bulington on several grounds. In
Difrancesco, the Court held that a criminal sentence handed down at the
second stage of a bifurcated trial was not to be accorded the same consti-
tutional finality as that which attaches to a jury acquittal. 66 The Court
reasoned that neither the history of sentencing practices in the United
States, nor precedent, nor the policy barring repeated attempts to con-
vict applied to sentencing decisions.67 In DiFrancesco, however, the Gov-
ernment had no second opportunity to prove its case to a trier of fact;
the federal statute merely provided for appellate review on the record of
the sentencing court.68 Also, the judge who made the sentencing deci-
sion in DiFrancesco had a far wider range of choices than did the jury in
Bullngon.69 Moreover, the Government did not have to prove that the
defendant was a "dangerous special offender" by the reasonable doubt
standard used in trials on guilt or innocence, but only by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. 70 The decision in .DiFrancesco, therefore, did not
mandate a similar result in the factually distinguishable Bullingon case.
Because standards exist to guide the jury in making its sentencing
decision, it is possible to fit Bullingon into the exception to the general
rule that there is no double jeopardy bar to retrying a defendant who
has overturned his conviction. The exception recognized in Burks v.
United Staes7l and Green v. United States72 that a defendant may not be
retried if his conviction is reversed on the ground that the evidence was
insufficient to convict, applies to Bullington. The standards and gui-
dance given to the jury in Missouri's capital sentencing procedure en-
sure that the sentence of life imprisonment means that the prosecution
failed to prove that the defendant deserved death. 73 The sentencing
64 101 S. Ct. 426.
65 18 U.S.C. §§ 3575, 3576 (1976).
66 101 S. Ct. at 437.
67 Id. at 435-37.
68 18 U.S.C. § 3576. See 101 S. Ct. at 1859.
69 See 101 S. Ct. at 1859. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3575 (b), a judge may sentence a dangerous
special offender to "an appropriate term not to exceed twenty-five years and not dispropor-
tionate in severity to the maximum term otherwise authorized by law for such felony."
70 101 S. Ct. at 1859.
71 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
72 355 U.S. 184.
73 101 S. Ct. at 1861.
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procedure in Missouri is so similar to a guilt or innocence trial that it
deserves to be treated similarly. 74 This new mode of sentencing, occa-
sioned by the Court's decision on death penalty legislation, Furman v.
Georgia,75 is a hybrid76 deserving of exceptional treatment by the Court.
The facts of Bulhngton required innovation, which the five members of
the majority provided. Justice Harlan's statement in his concurring and
dissenting opinion in North Carolina v. Pearce could have been written
about the situation in Bul'nglon:
Every consideration enunciated by the Court in support of the decision in
Green applies with equal force to the situation at bar. In each instance, the
defendant was once subjected to the risk of receiving a maximum punish-
ment, but it was determined by legal process that he should receive only a
specified punishment less than the maximum .... And the concept or
fiction of an 'implicit acquittal' of the greater offense,. . applies equally
to the greater sentence: in each case it was determined at the former trial
that the defendant or his offense was of a certain limited degree of 'bad-
ness' or gravity only, and therefore merited only certain limited
punishment.
77
The dissent's objection that there is a fundamental difference be-
tween the question of guilt or innocence and a sentencer's decision 78
ignores the unique nature of the sentencing function in capital cases in
Missouri. Justice Powell correctly pointed out that underlying the guilt
or innocence question, there is an objective, albeit undiscoverable fact,
while in the typical sentencing decision, the sentencer decides what type
and length of punishment fits the crime.79 In the Missouri procedure,
however, a jury must specify in writing which aggravating circum-
stances that it has found beyond a reasonable doubt that prompted it to
impose the death penalty.80 This is indeed an objective measure by
which the sentencer's decision can be deemed correct or erroneous. Tri-
ers of fact engage in the same kind of fact finding process when making
a guilt or innocence determination as a Missouri jury does when it finds
an aggravating circumstance. The dissent simply misstates the law in
Missouri when it says: "The sentencer's function is not to discover a
fact, but to mete out just deserts as he sees them."8' Since the prosecu-
74 Westen, The Three Faces, supra note 47, at 1022-23 n.68.
75 408 U.S. 238.
76 The dissent's characterization of this hybrid procedure as a sentencing decision and
therefore undeserving of fifth amendment protection adds little to the analysis of the decision,
for the crucial inquiry should center on the reasons for affording a given procedure double
jeopardy protection. If policy reasons support such protection, a mere label should not pro-
hibit its extension.
77 395 U.S. at 746 (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting).
78 101 S. Ct. at 1863-64 (Powell, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
80 Mo. REv. STAT. § 565.012.4.
81 101 S. Ct. at 1864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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tion in a Missouri sentencing procedure must prove aggravating circum-
stances beyond a reasonable doubt, 82 and the jury must specify in
writing which, if any, of those circumstances it found to exist, 83 the Mis-
souri sentencing decision closely resembles a guilt or innocence decision
in that it grounded on an objective fact.
The dissent did not believe that the Court should compare the pro-
cedures used in sentencing decisions imposing less than the most severe
sentence allowed by law with those used in decisions on guilt or inno-
cence. 84 The dissent instead focused on the reasons for desiring the
finality of these decisions.8 5 This argument runs contrary to established
double jeopardy theory, which teaches that the implicit acquittal inter-
est is more important and stronger than the finality interest.8 6 Society
has made a judgment that acquittals should be absolutely final no mat-
ter how erroneous they may be, while the defendant's interest in finality
is carefully balanced against society's interest in law enforcement.8 7 So-
ciety considers the jury's authority to acquit against the evidence to be
so important that it overrides all other considerations. 8  The Double
Jeopardy Clause was designed to prevent the overturning of jury deci-
sions such as the one in Bullington.
The majority does, however, offer support for its theory that Bull-
ington's interest in finality is deserving of protection. The prosecution,
with its greater resources, may be able to wear down the defendant if the
State had the chance to convince the jury to impose the death sen-
tence.8 9 This is similar to the classic double jeopardy concern over the
82 Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.012.4.
83 Id.
84 101 S. Ct. at 1864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
85 Id. The dissent did not, however, argue that the majority transfigured Missouri's crime
of capital murder into two crimes: capital murder with capital punishment and capital mur-
der without capital punishment. That argument would necessary fail, for the majority has
merely responded to the reality of the Missouri sentencing procedures as the Missouri legisla-
ture enacted them. If Missouri law requires the State to prove certain circumstances beyond
a reasonable doubt, the Constitution cannot require a defendant to endure that ordeal twice.
The brilliance of Justice Blackmun's majority opinion is its refusal to rely on easy labels and
characterizations and its insistence on delving into the realities of the situation before fashion-
ing its response. But see State ex rel. Westfall v. Mason, 594 S.W.2d at 912, app'd sub nom.,
Bullington v. Missouri, 101 S. Ct. 1852 (1981).
86 See Westen & Drubel, General Theofy, supra note 47, at 122-23. The Court has said that
the law attaches "particular significance" to an acquittal. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82,
91 (1978).
87 Westen & Drubel, General Theog, supra note 47, at 123.
88 Id. at 129-30. "The Double Jeopardy Clause thus allows the jury to exercise its consti-
tutional function as the conscience of the community in applying the law: to soften, and in
the extreme case, to nullify the application of the law in order to avoid unjust judgments."
Id. at 130.
89 101 S. Ct. at 1861 (citing United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. at 433). This could
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risk of harassment and conviction of an innocent person.90 A defendant
who is found undeserving of the death penalty by one jury should not be
subjected to the "'embarrassment, expense and ordeal' and the 'anxiety
and insecurity' "91 of a retrial. The dissent's argument that a second
sentence is as "correct" as the first 92 does not take into account the spe-
cial quality of the Missouri proceedings, during which the State must
prove certain facts before the imposition of the death penalty is possible.
Moreover, the assertion that the defendant is primarily concerned with
the determination of guilt or innocence, and not with the determination
of sentence93 is merely a hypothesis, unsupported by facts. Even if, as
Justice Powell argues, the societal interest in punishing the guilty out-
weighs the defendant's interest in finality,94 the overriding importance
of the finality of an acquittal amply supports the result reached by the
majority.
V. CONCLUSION
The classic double jeopardy consideration which suggests finality
for verdicts of acquittal also suggest finality for sentencing decisions ren-
dered during procedures which resemble a trial on the issue of guilt or
innocence. The majority persuasively likened sentencing decisions im-
posing less than the most severe penalty allowed by law to acquittals by
reasoning that in both instances the prosecution has not proved its case,
while the dissent countered with little else but precedent. It is true that
this decision departs from established precedent. The Court has seized
an opportunity to develop the law of double jeopardy in a logical way
and to adapt it to varying statutory schemes.
ANNE M. PACHCIAREK
occur if the State had more than one opportunity to convince a jury that the defendant
deserved the death penalty. 101 S. Ct. at 1861.
90 Id.
91 Id. (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. at 187-88).
92 101 S. Ct. at 1864 (Powell, J., dissenting).
93 United States v. DiFrancesco, 101 S. Ct. at 437.
94 101 S. Ct. at 1865 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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